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Dealing with the legacy of gross human rights violations in Guatemala:
grasping the mismatch between macro level policies and micro level
processes
Lieselotte Viaene∗
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Belgium
This article addresses the important nexus between macro level responses and micro level
processes when dealing with the aftermath of gross human rights violations. It focuses on
the case of Guatemala and the issue of ﬁnancial compensation for people affected by the
internal armed conﬂict. One of the key mechanisms of the horror of the counter-
insurgency war was the forced mass involvement of the civilian population through the
imposition of the Civil Defence Patrols in rural indigenous communities. This raises the
thorny question of who is victim in a micro reality of blurred lines between victims and
perpetrators. Several socio-political parameters ensured that two distinct compensation
programmes were created: one aimed at compensating the ex-civil patrollers; and a
National Reparations Programme for the victims. Ethnographic accounts from Maya
Q’eqchi’ victims and ex-civil patrollers reveal that these two state initiatives expose
frustration and incomprehensiveness among the beneﬁciaries towards both programmes
and reveal a mismatch between macro initiatives and micro reality, which undermines
the fragile process of rebuilding community trust.
Keywords: transitional justice; Guatemala; reparation; compensation; victim/perpetrator
dichotomy; Civil Defence Patrols; bottom-up and top-down analysis; ethnographic ﬁeld
research
Introduction
Countries emerging from authoritarian rule and periods of gross human rights violations
face considerable challenges. During the post-conﬂict process, questions about the restor-
ation of the rule of law, institutional reforms and security sector reforms are given high pri-
ority on the national and international peace building agenda. Another concern is that of
how to deal with the legacy of the gross human rights violations. Crucial here is the
booming ﬁeld of transitional justice which covers the different strategies and interventions
that states and international actors employ to deal with the legacy of mass atrocities.
Currently, there is a preference for a mix of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms which
includes criminal prosecution and trials, truth commissions, vetting and reparation
programmes.1 They are designed to achieve the ﬁelds’ driven goals which are justice,
reconciliation, truth recovery, guarantees of non-repetition and reparation. Indeed, since
its emergence some 15 years ago, the trend in the ﬁeld is towards a new transnational nor-
mative system.2 Yet transitional justice is also undergoing a process of natural maturating
from a young but quickly expanding ﬁeld of inquiry. One of the outcomes of this process is
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the growing awareness among scholars and practitioners that the current transitional justice
ﬁeld is highly abstract, general, legalistic and top-down.3 In a signiﬁcant pendulum motion,
academic thinking has now swung toward bottom-up, interdisciplinary, empirical and
concrete approaches. Currently, several interrelated trends that coincide in their attempts
to re-orient the ﬁeld can be seen. First, there is a trend in academic thinking and in the inter-
national community to move away from the ‘one size-ﬁts-all’ approach to transitional
justice4 because, ‘given the extraordinary range of national experiences and cultures,
how could anyone imagine there to be a universally relevant formula for transitional
justice?’.5 Secondly, a consensus has emerged in favour of changing lenses and broadening
the scope by looking closer at what is happening at the grassroots level. Concepts that are
gaining currency in recent debates include ‘transitional justice from below’, ‘local
approach’, ‘bottom-up’, ‘macro-micro’, and ‘local ownership’. Indeed, there is a need for
a ‘transitional justice from below’ which aims to explore ways of how ‘from above’ transi-
tional justice institutions and structures ‘can broaden ownership and encourage the partici-
pation of those who have been most directly affected by the conﬂict’.6 Indeed, there is an
emerging recognition that the expectations and the priorities of the affected people should
be taken into account at all stages of transitional justice interventions – conceptualisation,
design, implementation and management.7 The underlying premise is that those mechanisms
should serve the interests of the survivors in whose name the state and international actors
intervene. It is therefore crucial to understand what affected people seek from peace and tran-
sitional justice interventions. Further, there is a tendency of using traditional and informal
justice systems and revisiting traditional and local culture as a means of coming to terms
with mass atrocities.8 Indeed, cultural challenges also constitute part of this critical reﬂection
process. Nevertheless, there is little information in the ﬁeld on how survivors perceive the
driven goals of transitional justice and its mechanisms in different local and cultural contexts.
Moreover, it remains rare to ﬁnd empirical studies that base policy recommendations on con-
sultations of future beneﬁciaries or that examine the difﬁculties and issues that arise while
implementing peace and transitional justice driven processes.
Additionally, based on a case study of post-conﬂict Guatemala and the issue of ﬁnancial
compensation for people affected by its internal armed conﬂict, this paper asserts that due atten-
tion should be paid to the interconnection between macro level driven initiatives and micro
level processes when dealing with gross human rights violations. The case of Guatemala’s
internal armed conﬂict is another example of what is labelled in post-conﬂict literature an ‘inti-
mate’ crime. This concept refers to situations of armed conﬂicts, such asMozambique, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Peru and Rwanda, marked by a highly localised dimension, mass
civilian participation as well as involvement of civilian agents in the atrocities.9 As Schirmer
states in relation to the situation in Guatemala, ‘nowhere else in Latin America, an army
managed to mobilize and divide an indigenous population against itself to such an extent –
even to the point of forcing victims to become accomplices and kill one another’.10 Indeed,
one of the key ‘mechanisms of horror’11 of the Guatemalan counter-insurgency war was the
forced mass involvement of the civilian population through the imposition of the Civil
Defence Patrols (Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil – PAC) in rural indigenous communities.12
In fact, these PACs became the personiﬁcation of the militarisation of rural indigenous
areas. In such contexts of intimate crime, the qualiﬁcation of who is victim is a thorny question
because the violence creates more ‘grey zones’13 than the clear victim-perpetrator dichotomy.
Indeed, at the local level of indigenous communities the lines between victims and perpetrators
were blurred which has had a severe impact on local social recovery processes.
Against this background, the paper looks at two recent but distinct state programmes of
ﬁnancial compensation for people affected by the conﬂict and their impact at the local level.
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As Theidon argues, ‘reconciliation is forged and lived locally, and state policies can either
facilitate or hinder these processes’.14 In Guatemala, there is on the one hand the
programme of compensation for ex-civil defence patrollers, and the National Reparations
Programme that compensates victims of the conﬂict on the other. Both state programmes
emerged in a complex political but very polarised context and address the demands of
what at the macro level is seen as two separate and homogenous groups: ex-civil patrollers
or perpetrators and victims. However, at the micro level, this victim versus perpetrator
dichotomy is much more blurred than it is diametrical. In fact, ethnographic accounts
from Maya Q’eqchi’ victims and ex-PACs reveal that these two state initiatives undermine
the fragile local social recovery processes among survivors. This paper seeks to grasp this
mismatch between post-conﬂict macro level policies and micro level processes, discusses
the complexities at the different levels and attempts to interconnect both levels. By focusing
on the ‘social and political life’15 of the concept of compensation in the speciﬁc context of
Guatemala, it also attempts to contribute to the knowledge gap in transitional justice litera-
ture on localised approaches. The broader research question underlying this paper is about
the role of Maya Q’eqchi’ culture in post-conﬂict processes at the local level. To address
this research question 21 months of ethnographic research was conducted between July
2006 and March 2010 in the Alta Verapaz department, which is situated in the north
central part of the country. It is one of the most affected regions of the conﬂict and the
large majority of the population is indigenous Maya Q’eqchi’. While the current trend in
the transitional justice ﬁeld is to use population-based surveys on attitudes on peace and
social reconstruction that ensure a broad scope, it is argued that this approach fails to
explore the deeper local cultural logics in which needs, perceptions and attitudes are
embedded. For instance, Shaw considers ethnographic research to be the most appropriate
approach when studying post-conﬂict processes at the local level because it seeks to under-
stand processes, events and ideas on the people’s own terms and thus is a powerful tool for
challenging received wisdom and for understanding events and processes on the ground.16
Further, ethnographic micro level research is, according to Pouligny, Chesterman and
Schnabel, ‘very helpful in understanding the capacity of victims and perpetrators to recon-
struct new forms of social ties’.17 The research was conducted in three regions of Coba´n
municipality which is part of the Alta Verapaz department: Nimlahak’ok, Nimlasachal
and Salacium. To address the complex local and cultural reality multiple data collection
techniques, or methodological triangulation, have been used. The research included
semi-structured focus group discussions with internally displaced people, war widows,
elderly and ex-PACs; linguistic workshops; formal and informal interviews with commu-
nity leaders, spiritual guides, and local and foreign people with experiences of the conﬂict
and social reconstruction; participant observation during community meetings and com-
memorative ceremonies were conducted. For most survivors it was their ﬁrst opportunity
to share their opinions regarding coexistence, justice, reconciliation, reparation and truth
recovery, especially ex-PACs who regularly expressed their gratitude that someone
ﬁnally was listening to them.18 Further, several key stakeholders of national human
rights groups and indigenous victim organisations and interlocutors of civil society were
interviewed.
This article begins with a macro level analysis of how Guatemalan society is dealing
with the legacy of gross human rights violations, then shifts to a micro level description
of the intimate crime ﬁrst and ends by linking both levels. The ﬁrst section begins with a
brief sketch of the armed conﬂict and of the PAC system in Guatemala. The second
section outlines several interrelated socio-political variables of the broader macro level
context that are crucial in understanding the origin and different dynamics in which the
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two state programmes are embedded. In the third section, this paper examines the complex-
ities of the conﬂict and social recovery processes at the micro level. The next section pro-
ceeds to examine the perceptions of both ex-civil patrollers and victims regarding the two
state programmes. This exposes frustration and incomprehensiveness among the beneﬁci-
aries towards both programmes and reveals a mismatch between macro initiatives and
micro reality, which undermines the fragile process of rebuilding community trust.
Guatemala: dealing with its past of intimate crime
Guatemala has suffered one of the bloodiest and longest internal armed conﬂicts of the
Latin American continent, a conﬂict between the state’s army and left-wing guerrillas
who wanted to change fundamentally the exclusionary social, economic and political
reality of the majority of the Guatemalans. This resulted in a low-intensity civil war
lasting 36 years which ﬁnally ended on 26 December 1996 with the signing of comprehen-
sive peace agreements between the Guatemalan Government and the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG). At the beginning of the 1980s the conﬂict intensiﬁed under
the administrations of Generals Romeo Lucas Garcı´a (1978–1982) and Efraı´n Rı´os Montt
(March 1982–August 1983) who launched bloody military campaigns and scorched earth
strategies as part of the counter insurgency war. Over 200,000 people were killed or
disappeared during this period. According to the UN sponsored Commission on Historical
Clariﬁcation (CEH), most of the victims were indigenous civilians and acts of genocide
against Mayans were carried out in at least four areas of the country.19 The country suffered
626 massacres, over 400 villages were totally destroyed, 1.5 million people were internally
displaced and 150,000 ﬂed to Mexico. Of the killings, massacres, forced disappearances
and torture, the CEH found the army responsible for 93 per cent. Further, the PACs were
responsible for 18 per cent of human rights violations. Their main violations were:
capture or execution of (so-called) guerrilleros, torture and sexual violations.
The imposition of the PAC system in the early 1980s was a central element of the mili-
tary counter-insurgency strategy of total control of the rural indigenous areas. The PACs
were created in 1981 by General Lucas Garcı´a and became part of the National Security
and Development Plan of the military government of Efraı´n Rios Montt in 1982.20 They
were men between 15 and 60 years who functioned as the ears and eyes of the army in
their villages. They were also forced to take over military tasks like sweeping areas for guer-
rillas and attacking so-called subversive villages. Their total number remains unclear, but at
the peak of the war in the mid-1980s they numbered between 1,000,000 and 1,300,000
men, declining over the years to 400,000 in 1995. According to Remijnse, a central
aspect of the PAC was ‘their diversity between and within municipalities, and consequently
their varied and often unpredictable impact on local society. . . . Civil patrols were not static
entities, but different in background, the type of functions they performed, and their level
military activity’.21 The army has since 1982 continually been asserting the voluntary
nature of the PACs. However, early studies showed that throughout the 1980s, the PACs
were forced to patrol on penalty of severe punishment or death.22 Several ethnographic
studies on the destructive impact of the conﬂict have detailed how PACs were victims of
the army and at the same time were perpetrators towards their own neighbours.23 These
studies show how this system in some areas created space for chiefs of patrollers to
abuse their authority whilst ruling with impunity, to terrorise their village and region and
serve their own interests. In 1986, under the civil government of Vinicio Cerezo, the
civil patrols were renamed Voluntary Committees of Civil Defence (CVDCs), to emphasise
the voluntary nature of their work.24
4 L. Viaene
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
During the peace process, which took almost a decade, the demilitarisation of the state
and civil society and the concern of impunity of those responsible for human rights viola-
tions stood high on the international agenda. In fact, the UN, together with other inter-
national actors, played a crucial mediating role in facilitating agreements between the
government and the URNG.25 The mix of agreements opened up an opportunity for a
signiﬁcant transformation of Guatemalan society and resulted in long-term commitment
to change the country into a democratic, inclusive and pluri-cultural state.26 They
covered commitments on socio-economic reforms and the agrarian situation, rights of indi-
genous peoples, human rights, public security reforms and resettlement of refugees and
displaced persons. The agreements also demobilised the guerrilla forces and members of
different state and parastatal security forces.
During these peace negotiations the future of the PACs was also at issue. Human rights
defenders argued that their demobilisation and disarmament would put an end to the human
rights abuses. It was, however, not clear what would happen to the structures of the system
thereafter and there was no political room for a formal demobilisation, demilitarisation and
reintegration (DDR) programme or any other kind of beneﬁts or compensation for the
PACs.27 Several reasons for their exclusion in the peace agreements can be traced. First,
the URNG opposed equal treatment of the PACs with their own forces for which a DDR
programme was elaborated with support of the international community.28 A second
reason is that neither the government nor the army proposed to deal with the PACs
during the negotiations.29 Another reason for the exclusion lies in the fact that the army
from 1995 onwards, tried to convert PACs into ‘committees of peace and development’
maintaining the existing structure for development and public safety in the rural areas.
This raised the concern among human rights defenders that the armywas trying tomaintain
unofﬁcial inﬂuence and control over important actors and funds in the communities.
Therefore, according to Popkin, the international community did not want international
help for the development of the rural areas to be transferred to these kind of committees.30
A ﬁnal reason is that the negotiations on the agreements on human rights and the establish-
ment of the CEH has been difﬁcult; therefore as Hauge and Thoresen maintain, putting a
reintegration and compensation programme for the PAC on the agenda would have been a
delicate issue and put extra negative pressure on the negotiations.31
The Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed
Forces in a Democratic Society of September 1996 obliged the Guatemalan Government
to demobilise and disarm its own forces. According to this Agreement, the PACs had to
be demobilised within 30 days and they should cease any relationship with the army and
not be converted in any way that might reconstitute that relation. At that time the PACs
had already formally been dissolved by the Ramiro de Leo´n Carpio government through
a presidential decree in 1994.32 However, reports of the UN veriﬁcation mission of
human rights (MINUGUA) demonstrated that there were threats and attacks against patrol-
lers wanting to leave.33 Further, the reports mention that there were still military commis-
sioners34 and patrollers controlling rural villages and cases of abuse and violations of the
right to live, integrity and security. It was difﬁcult to give a clear answer to whether PACs
existed or had been dissolved between 1994 and 1996 as this varied depending on region,
department and municipality and their relationship with the army.35 Further, ethnographic
accounts of PAC in the Western Highlands attributes this continuation to fear for the
army, a way out of the violence; a means of self-defence and a growth of a sense of sover-
eignty within the communities.36 By December 1996, in total 270,906 PAC-members were
demobilised under the supervision of MINUGUA.37 However, some ex-PAC leaders and
ex-commissioners maintained their power and control over the communities.38
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Compensation for people affected by the armed conﬂict
De Greiff points out that one of the huge challenges that any reparation and DDR pro-
gramme faces is to determine the future beneﬁciaries, namely how to select the rights
which the violation of will lead to reparation measures and how to avoid the exclusion
or over-inclusiveness of ex-combatants.39 The speciﬁc Guatemalan transitional justice
context makes this qualiﬁcation process even more complex. Before moving to the descrip-
tion of the origin and content of the two state programmes of compensation, it is crucial ﬁrst
to sketch brieﬂy several parameters that characterise the social-political climate.
First, it is important to note that, according to the Guatemalan Human Rights defender
Helen Mack:
. . . it is clear that a clear reference to reconciliation in the peace agreements was deliberately
omitted, despite the fact that such a process is indispensable for overcoming the adverse con-
ditions at the negotiations. . .because the concept of ‘reconciliation’ asks for major social, pol-
itical and institutional transformations, for which the Guatemalan society is not prepared,
especially those groups who have the power.40
She further states that there is a lack of a shared conceptualisation of reconciliation at the
national level and a real reconciliation process has never been stimulated. In fact, the lack of
a common national peace agenda and concept on reconciliation has its repercussions on the
state’s efforts to deal with the legacy of the conﬂict: minimal progress in the accomplish-
ment of the peace agreements has been made due to the absence of political will.
Secondly, since their creation in the early 1980s, the PACs have been subject to two
decades of commotion and heated national debates. Importantly however, there has
never been an open national discussion about the deﬁnition of victimhood or an attempt
to nuance the homogeneity of the PACs as perpetrators. In fact, their complexity and diver-
sity has been omitted during the peace process by the negotiation parties and civil society.
Actually, the discussion about the PACs during the negotiations in the early 1990s was
centred on one question: was the participation in the civil patrols voluntary or not?41
Early studies42 had already indicated their involuntary nature and this has later been
conﬁrmed by the two truth commissions, the CEH and the project for Recovery of Histori-
cal Memory (REMHI) of the Catholic Church. In fact, the ﬁnal report of REMHI described
the PACs as one of the ‘mechanisms of horror’.43 Edgar Gutierrez, ex director of REMHI
and ex minister of foreign affairs during the Portillo government, attributes the lack of a
discussion about the heterogeneity of the PACs to a one-side reading of the conﬂict at
the macro level as there has been little reﬂection on military, psychological, cultural, socio-
logical and economical dimensions of the conﬂict.44 He in fact states that for civil organ-
isations simplifying the conﬂict and using the victim-perpetrator dichotomy has been
comfortable and politically correct. Human rights groups generally portrayed the PACs
as a homogenous group of perpetrators who operated at the local level of the indigenous
communities. Another crucial fact in understanding the polemic on the ex-PAC is the
hard reality that accountability remains susceptible because the impunity of the armed
forces for past atrocities persists after 25 years. Only in three cases of the 669 documented
massacres by the CEH have those materially responsible been successfully prosecuted by
the Guatemalan judicial system.45 Therefore, the ﬁght against the institutionalised impunity
is the key concern and focus of human rights organisations. In their discourse, those organ-
isations maintain the polarity between ex-PACs as perpetrators on the one hand and victims
on the other. According to Jelin this polarisation is inherent to the interpretive framework of
human rights violations because ‘the polarity is between human rights violators on one side
6 L. Viaene
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and victims on the other’.46 In fact, Bores states that in human rights discourses ‘victims
and perpetrators are usually referred to as two completely separate and homogenous sets
of people’.47 However, she further argues that ‘differences between the two groups are
perhaps not as clear-cut as human rights scholars and activist. . .tend to portray them and
that highlights that the homogeneity that is assumed about the individuals within each
group is similarly overstated’.48 Nevertheless, if against the background of this macro
level context of total impunity, national human rights organisations were to start making
a plea in favour of a more nuanced reading of the conﬂict, this would undermine their legiti-
macy as human rights defenders in their quest for justice. Yet this strategic macro level
position of human rights organisations clashes with the complex and blurred micro
reality of the affected rural communities as will be shown in the next section. In fact,
sticking to a strict victim-perpetrator dichotomy in such a context is what Goveir and
Verwoerd describe as ‘logically simplistic, ethically unfair, psychologically misleading
and prudentially undermining’.49
A ﬁnal important contextual element is that peace building and transitional justice
efforts are very top-down driven in Guatemala and do not take into account local and
cultural resources. Several human rights professionals working for years in the countryside,
have in interviews raised the fact that all governmental and (inter)national non-governmen-
tal organisation (NGO) policies and programmes are designed in the capital based on a ‘far
away vision’.50 In this ‘capital-bubble’ it is the vision of the ladino51 that still dominates
and most of the time is not familiar with the reality of the transitional complexity of
rural indigenous areas.
Against this socio-political backdrop and the political commitments of the peace agree-
ments two distinct state programmes of compensation for people affected by the conﬂict
were created.
Compensation programme for ex-PACs52
The exclusion of the PACs in the peace agreements generated an accumulation of bitterness
among some ex-PACs which created a boomerang effect with a strong claim for compen-
sation from the state.53 The ﬁrst demand for compensation was publically made in 1997 in
the Pete´n department. This was the ﬁrst wave of unrest among former civil patrollers. It was
Alfonso Portillo, the presidential candidate for the right wing Guatemalan Republican Front
(FRG), who in 1999 again placed the issue of compensation for ex-PACs at the forefront.54
He promised to pay ex-PACs for their services to defend the country and private property
against communism.55 Ex-PACs used this electoral promise as their main argument in their
future compensation claims. Demands for ﬁnancial compensation resurfaced in June 2002
when ex-PACs in the Pete´n blocked the airport of Flores and other strategic places.
President Portillo travelled to the Pete´n and gave a speech in which he promised that the
government would satisfy their demands. After negotiations an agreement on compensation
was reached and the government announced a new special tax to ﬁnance this. Consequently,
ex-PACs started to remobilise in different regions and municipalities throughout the
country. Interestingly, this occurred mainly in regions with low intensity experience or
even lack of the internal conﬂict and thus low ex-PACs presence, whereas those
ex-PACs who qualiﬁed as perpetrators of atrocities did not remobilise nor demand
compensation.56
A heated discussion emerged in which human rights organisations accused the FRG
government of exploiting the situation in view of the coming elections.57 Under this
pressure the government changed its tax proposal and acquired international loans.
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Originally, the demand was Q20,000 ($2,750) per person, but ﬁnally the total amount was
Q5,214 ($717) which would be paid in three instalments. Between November 2002 and
June 2003 ex-PACs and widows of ex-PACs could register at the administrative centre
of each department. The ﬁrst payment of Q1,747.20 ($240) was made during the Portillo
government in 2003 and beneﬁted a total of 188,959 people of which 176,123 were
ex-PAC and 12,836 widows.58 There was a huge protest from human rights organisations,
the UNRG and international embassies against this payment.59 As the national human
rights organisation CALDH formulated it in the press: ‘intimidation, torture, disappear-
ances and massacres cannot be considered a digniﬁed and remunerative job’.60 Civil
society was also concerned about the impunity which PAC members enjoyed for human
rights violations and about the lack of agreement on reparations for victims.
Therefore, several human rights organisations brought an action against this measure
before the Constitutional Court which in 2005 judged it to be unconstitutional. The main
argument was that no labour contract existed between PACs and the state because their
service was considered voluntary. The new government of Berger changed the modality
of the compensation in 2005 into a programme of ‘Planting Trees’ and provided Q445
million ($61 million).61 Seventy million trees were planted by ex-PACs who would
receive the promised two other payments as compensation for this reforestation work. In
total 544,620 ex-PACs registered for the programme of whom, currently, 15 per cent
have not received the third payment.62 However, not all PACs on the list received all
three payments, due to bureaucratic problems and also because some of them refused to
work for the government to receive their compensation.
National Reparations Programme (PNR)
The creation of a reparations programme was a long and complex process that faced numer-
ous obstacles and was deﬁned by political struggle.63 During the peace negotiations,
national victim organisations strongly demanded reparation measures for the victims of
the conﬂict. Reparation demands became a state commitment with the General Agreement
on Human Rights64 of 1994 forming part of the peace agreements. This states that repara-
tion and/or assistance to victims of human rights violations is a humanitarian obligation.
Furthermore, the CEH recommended immediate installation of a reparation programme
over ten years which includes restoration of material possessions, compensation, psychoso-
cial rehabilitation and reparation as well as restoration of individual dignity and satisfaction.
The CEH deﬁned that the beneﬁciaries are victims (or their relatives) namely ‘those persons
who have personally suffered human rights violations and acts of violence connected with
the internal armed confrontation’.65
Interestingly, the CEH also recommended collective measures, depending on the type of
violation, to foster reconciliation between victims and perpetrators without stigmatising
either66:
Therefore, collective reparatory measures for survivors of collective human rights violations
and acts of violence, and their relatives, should be carried out within a framework of territo-
rially based projects to promote reconciliation, so that in addition to addressing reparation,
their other actions and beneﬁts also favour the entire population, without distinction
between victims and perpetrators.
The political conﬂict on the payment of PACs in 1999 paradoxically made political room
for serious negotiations between the Portillo government and civil society for the creation
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of a reparations programme. Yet the Portillo’s government ﬁnally approved a National
Reparation Programme (PNR) by an Executive Decree in 2003.67 The PNR had a
comprehensive reparation design with ﬁve measures: material restitution, economic repara-
tions, psychosocial reparation and rehabilitation, honouring civilian victims and cultural
reparations. Due to lack of political will, differences among civil society organisations
and the PNR’s weak legal basis, its implementation was postponed until 2005 when a
new Executive Degree68 was promulgated containing regulations for a restructured PNR.
The Manual of Qualiﬁcation of the Beneﬁciaries of the PNR that deﬁnes who is the bene-
ﬁciary of the PNR clearly states that all ex-PAC that appear in the register of the programme
for the payment of ex-PACs, even if they have not received any instalment, are excluded
from any reparation measure of the PNR.69 Although the original measures remained,
individual ﬁnancial compensation was prioritised for several reasons. The organisation of
the implementation of ﬁnancial compensation is the ‘easiest’ one of the ﬁve and victim
organisations also strongly demanded it. The beneﬁciaries are survivors of torture or
sexual assault and relatives of victims of illegal executions, massacres or disappearances.
The compensation is Q24,000 ($3,300) for a deceased relative and Q10,000 ($1,370)–
Q20,000 ($2,750) for sexual assault and/or torture. Since its start in 2005, the PNR has
compensated 26,041 beneﬁciaries.70 At the end of 2009, the PNR started with the
implementation of the measure of material restitution through pilot projects of housing.
In total, 888 stone houses of six by six metres have been built.71
Before looking at how these two state initiatives are perceived by their beneﬁciaries and
their impact on the local reconstruction processes, the ways Maya Q’eqchi’ are dealing with
this legacy of intimate violence will be explored. As there exist no monolithic experience of
the conﬂict in Guatemala, ﬁrst follows a brief contextualisation of the conﬂict in the Alta
Verapaz department.
Complexity of transitional communities at the micro level
The CEH report shows that, after El Quiche´ and Huehuetenango, Alta Verapaz was the third
worst-affected department by human rights violations and the Q’eqchi’ ethnic group was
the second worst-affected.72 The semi-feudal system on the ﬁncas or big plantation
farms, characterised by a lack of freedom, miserly low salaries, high work pressure,
abuse and absence of schooling, is indicated as the root cause of the conﬂict in the depart-
ment.73 Due to the scorched-earth tactics between 1981 and 1983, at least 40 per cent of the
Q’eqchi’ were displaced from their communities and 20,000 were forced to live as hidden
refugees in the mountains for months or even years.74 They struggled to survive in the
mountains in extreme conditions and were constantly forced to move place, resulting in
death from hunger, disease and susto (fright or spirit loss). The most severely hit munici-
palities were Coba´n, Chisec and San Cristobal. In addition to the scorched earth strategy
in the regions of guerrilla presence, the army also imposed the formation of the PACs in
the rural areas that were under military control. The total amount of the PACs during the
conﬂict is unclear; however during the demobilisation in 1996, the department had
the second-highest number of patrollers in the country (72,699).75 Alta Verapaz’s PACs
were responsible for seven per cent of human rights violations, whereas in El Quiche´,
46,995 PACs were responsible for 59 per cent of the violations.76 The reason for this
high difference in responsibility is unclear. Probably it is related to lower reporting and
less active functioning of the CEH ofﬁce in Coba´n.77
With the amnesty offered by Rı´os Montt’s government in 1982 and the military policy
of promoting a large-scale return of internally displaced people, many Q’eqchi’, decimated
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by prosecution and hunger, decided to return from the mountains.78 Thousands of displaced
Q’eqchi’ were taken in by the army and moved to military camps or ‘Poles of Development’
in the region, where they usually received ideological ‘re-education’.79 The men were
obliged to patrol the camps and had to sweep the area for guerrilla camps and search and
convince groups who were still hiding in the mountains to return. Indeed, two groups of
PACs can be distinguished in the region: the men who were under military control from
the beginning of the scorched-earth campaigns and the internally displaced men who
ﬁrst survived months or years hiding in the mountains and who had to patrol in the military
camps and later in their communities.
Toward the end of the 1980s, the military camps closed and the internally displaced
people had to relocate and reintegrate into the region. This difﬁcult and complex process
generally happened in three ways: the return to the old villages, the incorporation into
other villages and the creation of new villages.80 During the initial phases of relocation,
displaced people faced humiliations, accusations and threats from PACs and those who
had stayed in their villages. The army had created a climate of fear and hostility, as part
of its psychological war, causing deep distrust of those ‘from the mountains’ (aj rub’el
pim) who were seen as guerrilleros. The search for land in the region caused frictions
among survivors and divided groups and families. Returnees from Mexico could count
on support from the international community and the state to buy land, whereas the intern-
ally displaced were forgotten. The army also forced some displaced people to occupy the
land and territory of people who had ﬂed to Mexico, which created conﬂicts with the retur-
nees who reclaimed their land.81 Until their formal demobilisation in 1996, PACs remained
in the villages of the region.
Social reconstruction in the Q’eqchi’ region proceeded slowly, due to no aid from the
state and little aid from national or international organisations. Places and regions such as
Rabinal in Baja Verapaz, the Ixil Triangle and the returnees from Mexico in the Ixca´n, both
part of the Quiche´ department, over the years received strong national and international
attention. Even today, compared to those regions, a strong presence of international
agencies, NGOs or the state in projects designed to support Q’eqchi’ in Alta Verapaz is
lacking. It was mainly the Catholic Church that played a role in local social reconstruction
in some affected areas through the social interventions of the Pastoral Social in Coba´n and
later the work of the REMHI-Alta Verapaz ofﬁce. Almost 25 years after the massacres, the
survivors still face structural inequities. Alta Verapaz counts the highest number of land
conﬂicts of the country.82 Further, the people must deal with poverty caused by the contrast
between the high cost of living and very low incomes, discrimination and abandonment by
the state, and ﬁnally divisionism provoked by the conﬂict.83
The CEH clearly stated that the magnitude of the violence and the imposition of the
PACs had seriously undermined trust within many communities and caused a rupture in
the Mayan social fabric and indigenous authority system, disrupting the social norms
and elements of the cultural identity.84 The process of ‘picking up the pieces’85 is very dif-
ﬁcult in regions that have suffered intimate crime and where people who have committed
atrocities in their own community are living together with their victims. The necessity of
interdependent social and economic survival procured an inevitable co-existence of
divided people. In the regions of Nimlahak’ok, Salacium and Nimlasachal, people have
engaged with the legacy of the mass atrocities. The ways Q’eqchi’ victims and ex-PACs
have reconstructed new social ties varies between communities depending on how they
had been affected, the possibility of obtaining land during the relocation process and the
persistent political power of ex-chiefs of PACs. Nonetheless, it is clear, as will be illustrated,
that they have not waited for the formal justice system to be rebuilt and/or interventions of
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national and international actors implemented to start the process of ‘re-imagining peace’86
or reshaping social norms, practices and relationships and of ﬁnding a new modus vivendi.
The expression nimla rahilal that Q’eqchi’ victims and ex-PACs use when referring to
the period of the conﬂict reveals their cultural understanding of the conﬂict. Nimla is large;
rahilal means suffering and pain (physical, emotional and spiritual). Nimla rahilal always
refers to the sort of pain that is the result of a ‘ﬁnal’ loss: the loss of a family member or the
loss of a harvest or home due to natural disaster. A ﬁnal loss implies pain that cannot be
relieved; it is an irreparable loss. Indeed, the pain and suffering caused by the nimla
rahilal will never leave the heart of the survivors as one displaced man put it: ‘It is like
a thorn in our souls, it is like having a knife in our stomachs.’
Furthermore, the conﬂict not only violated their human rights and caused human suffer-
ing; it also violated and transgressed social and spiritual norms established by the commu-
nities, leading to the breakdown of their tuqtuukilal (tranquillity, harmony, peace). The
expression xoo’e’xmux, which frequently appears during interviews with survivors,
means ‘they desecrated the cosmos and us as humans’. This reﬂects the desecration of
the natural, social and spiritual world, because of the destruction of the holy maize ﬁelds
and the sacred mountains (Tzuultaq’a).87
Despite the abandonment by NGOs and the state, people in the Nimlahak’ok region
made remarkable efforts in the mid-1990s to confront the local history of political violence.
In November 1995, a huge white cross was erected on the highest hill, with two marble
plaques bearing the names of 916 victims. This was the result of an extensive, well-
coordinated process that started in 1994 involving 28 communities in an area of 600km2.
At its origin lay dreams of a number of elders about a large white cross emerging from a
mountain, which according to Flores was interpreted as ‘a supernatural sign from their
disappeared relatives who died during the violence and who had not been buried in accord-
ance with traditional practices’.88 The names on the marble plaques belong to victims of the
massacres, but also to people who disappeared or died from malnutrition, disease or susto
(fright or spirit loss) in the mountains. Also included are names of victims who were PACs.
Remarkably, although fear still ruled, some PAC members of the neighbouring village
Salacium helped with the construction of the cross. Salacium, at that time a three-hour walk
across a sloping landscape, had a very different experience of the war. This village was
totally controlled by the military base of Playa Grande and formed the limit of the
scorched-earth campaigns. So the men were forced to patrol the village and the region.
The commissioners and chiefs of PACs of the village provoked terror and fear.89 In Sala-
cium, similar to other regions under military control, many people converted to evangelical
churches during the conﬂict to save their lives as the Catholics were accused of being
‘communists’ and ‘guerrilleros’. This is the main reason why the people of Salacium did
not participate in the construction of the cross. The people from Nimlaha’kok received
several threats from commissioners and chiefs of PACs of Salacium that they would
destroy the cross. However, despite this, some of their PACs members gave the names of
their dead relatives and helped with its construction.
Each year, since 1995, on 3 November and on the Saturday before Easter, a Mayan
ceremony and community celebration take place near the cross to commemorate the loss
of loved ones. An important leader stated that the cross is not only for the community of
Sahak’ok but for the entire region and that:
. . . it is a road to bring us to a dialogue and would lead to a revival among us. So that we would
not be longer rejected, not only those who suffered the violence [in the mountains], but also
those who did not suffer.90
The International Journal of Human Rights 11
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
Some years ago, a non-asphalted road was constructed connecting Coba´n with Playa
Grande and passes the two villages. The cross is visible from far away when coming
from both directions. Now ten years later, these evangelical ex-PACs from Salacium are
acknowledging the importance of the cross. As one ex-PAC says:
For me it is not a lie [what happened during the conﬂict]; that cross has been built because the
violence has occurred. So, it is a sign because it happened, it is a sign for the compan˜eros. How
many were burned during that violence? That’s why they made that sign where the names of
those who died appear; it is true all the names are there (group interview, May 2008).
Other ex-PACs from Salacium say that ‘the cross is a sign of the armed conﬂict, of the
problems and everything that happened during those times’, ‘it is a sign and a testimony
that cannot wipe out the violence which happened among us’ and ‘it reminds us that
what happened is true’. The cross is an important locally and culturally driven experience
of memorialisation, recovery and dissemination of historical memory.
Another important sign of the slowly proceeding social recovery process in the region is
the fact that currently, in the Nimlaha’kok region, the two main local authorities adminis-
trating the region are an ex-PAC who never hid in the mountains and an ex-guerrilla leader.
For seven years this ex-PAC has been the president of an important regional council and in
2008 an ex-guerrilla leader became the mayor of the region. Both were asked by the people
to take up this important responsibility.91 Fostering unity in the region is what binds these
two leaders. However, here a too-romanticised and harmonious reading of such local social
reconstruction processes must be avoided. Complex social, economical and power realities
should not be overseen in understanding the ways of social recovery.
As one local leader from Sahak’ok explains:
There are people who did understand; there are people who want to life united, who want to be
in community [together]. But there are also people who don’t want to be in the community,
there is divisionism and there are confrontations. There is divisionism because of the different
religions in the different regions. There is no goodness; there is no tranquillity (personal
interview, May 2008).
An ex-PAC compares the impact of the conﬂict on communal life with a destroyed beehive:
It is difﬁcult now; it is difﬁcult for us to come together as one, because it has all fallen apart,
yes. You could say that it is like an ants’ nest that was destroyed or a beehive, they all go their
own way – you cannot bring them together anymore (group interview, July 2007).
For example, Salacium, with its mix of victims on both sides and strong presence of
ex-PACs, is still a conﬂictive village and region. Before the war, economic power belonged
to several ladino families who owned almost all of the land. The conﬂict has not changed
this unequal power relation between ladinos and indigenous people, as the majority of
indigenous families in Salacium still rent parcels from them to provide their basic needs.
The presence of eight different evangelical churches in the centre of the village does not
really foster unity.
In Xalab’e, a remote community in the Nimlasachal region, another large cross was
erected in 1999 to commemorate 468 victims from 24 communities. This cross, surrounded
by mountains, stands in the middle of the region where the massacres took place. Also here,
ex-PACs from the neighbouring villages helped with the construction of the cross and
names of PAC victims appear. One leader of this community who lost family members
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when hiding says that at ﬁrst there were many accusations from ex-PACs towards them,
those ‘from the mountains’. Yet, over the years their behaviour has changed and the
reproaches have stopped. As he says: ‘we are seeing each other as equals. . .now there
exists again some usilal [goodness]’. This leader even proposed that it would be good to
engage a mutual understanding of the different experiences with the conﬂict.
Besides these overt and visible local experiences on social recovery and reconciliation
ethnographic accounts reveal that beneath that surface there is substantial activity that at
ﬁrst glance is invisible. In fact, Maya Q’eqchi’ survivors have managed to mobilise local
and cultural practices on justice and reconciliation to face the legacy of the atrocities and
to ﬁnd a new modus vivendi.92 At the local level of Q’eqchi’ communities, impunity, as
deﬁned by international law, is not the end of accountability, nor truth recovery or repara-
tion. Here, the internal logic of the cosmos through an invisible force creates a space in
which local perpetrators can reintegrate into communal life and through which victims’
pain and suffering are acknowledged.
In the next session the perceptions of both Q’eqchi’ groups regarding the programme of
compensation for the ex-PACs and the PNR will be discussed.
The mismatches between post-conﬂict macro level policies and micro level
processes
Asmentioned, state interventions can foster or hinder processes of local social recovery. Eth-
nographic accounts from Q’eqchi’ victims and ex-PACs reveal that both state programmes
seriously crosscut and undermine the fragile social recovery process, stirring up emotions
amongst them and even leading to an incomprehensiveness toward the state as such.
Frustrations towards the PAC programme and the PNR
There is a growing awareness among victims that ex-PACs were forced to participate in the
conﬂict and also suffered. However, the victims are deeply frustrated and disillusioned that
ex-PACs have already received compensation. Most PNR beneﬁciaries have to wait for
ﬁnancial compensation, sometimes for over four years. For victims it is difﬁcult to under-
stand how the government can ‘reward’ those who are co-responsible for their suffering and
pain. As one victim says: ‘they are not digniﬁed to receive this aid’. The fact that ex-PACs
managed to be heard through manifestations by several presidential candidates and govern-
ments, offended victims. Victims, who participated in the CEH or the REMHI investigation,
stated that they had heard for years that help was coming, but the promises remained unful-
ﬁlled. It affronted victims that during the political debate on PACs compensation, the PAC
stated that they had suffered. Victims acknowledge the suffering, but it was certainly not
equal. According to the victims the suffering of the PACs was different because, as they
stated during interviews, ‘they never lost their houses’, ‘they could “come home” after
patrolling’, ‘they did not starve from hunger’, ‘they did not live as animals in the moun-
tains’ and ‘if they had lost someone, they could bury their loved ones properly’. Further,
many displaced people recall that ex-PACs had ﬁnancial beneﬁts during the war as they
regularly cleared out the houses that they had left behind. So, although the passage of
time makes victims aware of the heterogeneity of ex-PACs and the forced character of
their violent acts, the victims are internalising and using strategically the macro level
victim-perpetrator dichotomy in discussions about PAC compensation.
Among ex-PACs, several perceptions exist in relation to their compensation. Most
ex-PACs think that they deserved the payment because they were forced to patrol,
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during which they could not work and could not provide for their families. The army also
prohibited them from going to their ﬁelds in the mountains, because they could be seen and
accused of being one of ‘those from the mountains’. The men suffered physically as they
had to patrol in the cold, rain and mud. Several elders complained that they are still suffer-
ing. As one ex-PAC says:
For our children it served, for our wives it served, but for us men, no, there is nothing. The only
thing we had was hunger, having to put up with thirst in the little post, during the whole night,
every day (Group interview, May 2008).
There are many complaints about the bureaucratic problems of the PAC programme.
Several elders could not fulﬁl the bureaucratic requirements because of a lack of the
required documents. Others have only received one or two instalments. There are also
ex-PACs who disagreed with the ‘Planting Tree’ programme, because they found it incor-
rect that they had to work again to receive the rest of the instalments, as they had patrolled
already during the conﬂict.
The strict bureaucratic requirements also affected many war widows whose husbands
patrolled during the conﬂict. The representative of the ex-PACs in the region of Salacium
explains that some of the war widows applied for the PAC programme, but could not
present the necessary documents such as the PAC identiﬁcation card of their husband or
the marriage act, so did not receive the PAC compensation.93 In fact, as he further explains,
because these widows now appear on the PAC lists, they have lost the right to be beneﬁci-
aries of the PNR, even if they are internally displaced and thus victims.
Further, ex-PACs feel deceived by the government, because much higher levels of com-
pensationwere promised. Theywere not informed that the reforestation programme included
the maintenance of the planted trees. The travel costs and food during working days is not
reimbursed. Many ex-PACs, certainly in Salacium, expressed their discontent about the
continuing demonisation of them in the national press and by human rights organisations.
Also the PNR with its prioritisation on individual ﬁnancial compensation fails to
provide real satisfaction for both the remedied victims and those whose cases are still
pending.94 It creates a sentiment of guilt not only toward deceased relatives, but also
toward others who have suffered, but who, for bureaucratic reasons have not obtained
compensation. As an internally displaced man says:
Paying for violence. We do not like it either, it is like I said, they are only paying for the dead: it
is like for my mother, they are going to pay me for her. I will eat my mother, I will chew my
mother. What I would like is for all those who suffered from the violence to be helped (Personal
interview, August 2007).
Evidence from the interviews suggests widespread endorsement of complementary collec-
tive reparation measures. A beneﬁciary of the PNR says:
But I don’t like the fact that they are helping those who have died. For us it would be, that
everyone who suffered from the violence, that they should receive help. I don’t like the fact
that they are not being helped (Group interview, September 2007).
Further, victims asked for restitution or compensation from the government for destroyed
material possessions, such as houses, livestock, cornﬁelds, beans, clothes, millstones and
traditional instruments. One major request of victims and ex-PACs is that they be
granted title to land. Because of the ﬁnca system, most Q’eqchi’ do not possess any
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land, not even a small parcel. As previously said, heated land conﬂicts continue to this day
in Guatemala, with the highest concentration in Alta Verapaz.
Remarkably, during the interviews, no compensated ex-PAC complained about the
smaller amount received in comparison with the beneﬁciaries of the PNR, but several
ex-PACs expressed their concern that not all widows receive the ﬁnancial compensation
from the PNR. A local authority, once an ex-PAC leader, states:
I hear that not all the sen˜oras are receiving compensation. There should be a law that executes
that, because they also are poor. Or they should give them a house so that they can live well
(group interview, July 2007).
However, with the older ex-PACs much frustration and disappointment exist for never
having received any help from the government, whereas returnees from Mexico have
received houses and development projects in the 1990s and currently displaced people
receive houses from the PNR. An old ex-PAC says that the government is acting as a
father that only loves one of his sons and not both:
We are old and we patrolled, but where is the goodness [usila], where is the welfare that the
president talked about? No one loves us; they love the one but not the other. It is like a
father that loves one son but not the other. That is what they are doing to us and we don’t
have money. On what are we going to live when we don’t have money, and we are already
elders, so we cannot manage to work anymore (group interview, April 2008).
This image reﬂects a more profound frustration among ex-PACs, namely that during the
conﬂict they did not have the opportunity to choose their role as PAC/perpetrator. Now,
when ﬁnally social and ﬁnancial beneﬁts are arriving to the communities affected by the
conﬂict, again they are modelled in a role that they cannot choose.
‘We are all sons of the government’
As the PAC programme succeeded prior to the creation of the PNR, several internally
displaced people, who later had patrolled in the military camps, registered themselves on
the PAC lists in the course of 2002 and 2003. In some communities there was, at the
time of the registration, an internal critical reﬂection about this compensation which
made displaced men who had patrolled in the military camps not register, because they
identiﬁed themselves more as victims than as PAC. In fact, this critical reﬂection occurred
mainly in communities in which the Catholic Church by the Pastoral Social or the REMHI-
Alta Verapaz ofﬁce had worked. In other regions this critical refection did not take place and
displaced people registered on the PAC lists because of economic needs. Indeed, the extre-
mely poor conditions of the indigenous people were an important motive to apply to the
PAC programme even though they were victims. In fact, 41.2 per cent of the population
of Alta Verapaz live in extreme poverty, the highest percentage in the country, and Alta
Verapaz (84.1 per cent), together with El Quiche´ (84.6 per cent), houses the greatest
number of people living in total poverty.95 At the time of the PAC registration there
were already national negotiations going on about a national reparation programme, but
this was information that did not reach the communities. Indeed, the fact that those appear-
ing on the PAC lists would lose future rights of being a beneﬁciary of such a reparation
programme was unknown. The harsh micro reality of the blurred line between victim
and PAC/perpetrator is not taken into account when taking the political decision to
exclude all PACs from the PNR. Therefore, men who had lost family members through
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the army’s actions, but were still forced to patrol, applied to the PAC programme, but there-
fore also lost the right to be a beneﬁciary of the PNR.
Even more, the recent implementation of the measure of material restitution is con-
fronted at community level with this blurred line and the heterogeneity among ex-PACs.
In Alta Verapaz 19 communities have beneﬁtted from the housing project of the PNR
and in several communities families have been excluded from the project because they
appear in the PAC register.96 For example in one community of the Nimlahak’ok region,
only six of the 25 families who applied for this reparation measure will receive a house
due to this exclusion. However, those 25 families all lost their houses during the
scorched-earth campaigns of the army and family members hid for several years in the
mountains. Those men deﬁne themselves as victims because they have lost everything
and deﬁne the PAC as those who helped the army to massacre them, but for purely econ-
omic reasons they applied under the PAC programme.97
In fact, at the micro level the PACs is no longer an active mechanism of physical horror
that is involved with human rights violations towards its own people. Now it is an active
mechanism of psychological horror towards individuals and their families. The two distinct
compensation programmes confront not only the internally displaced men who patrolled in
the camps with this perverse reality; they also confront others whose conﬂict experience left
other blurred traces.
A striking account is that of Juan, from Salacium whose mother, father, sister and
brother were killed by soldiers and whose uncle, father-in-law and brother-in-law died in
a massacre carried out by guerrillas. He was forced to participate as a patroller, so was a
victim of both sides and is ex-PAC. For Juan the most important thing is that aid reaches
every survivor, because ‘we are all children of the government’:
Hopefully the government, yes, I wish that they help us with the suffering that we had to live
with, that they help us with this pain, because I don’t want, and I don’t like, that only some are
helped. And I, as I’m not a son of the government, because all of us are sons of the government,
not only me, not only those who suffered violence in the mountains, we are all children of the
government (group interview, May 2008).
As several key stakeholders of civil society have stated in interviews, the old ideological
divisions remain playing an essential role at the level of national politics and civil
society. Therefore, the question of whether ex-PACs may also be viewed as victims and
the reality of forced perpetrator are taboo. This has serious consequences. The state’s
unequal treatment not only generates disappointment among victims and ex-PACs but
also frictions in the communities. In fact the speciﬁc design and management of both
programmes re-victimises victims and ex-PACs. Here, it is important to note that the
recommendation of the CEH to promote local reconciliation and overcome stigmatisation
of victims and perpetrators has never been assumed, nor by the succeeding governments,
nor the international or national human rights organisations. In turn, they adopted the
deﬁnition of victims of the CEH including returnees and internally displaced people, but
excluded PACs who were victims of human rights violations.
Further, although many ex-PACs are also traumatised and face inevitable psychological
challenges, it appears that major national NGOs giving psychosocial attention in affected
communities are excluding them from their sessions, both because they perceive ex-PACs
as perpetrators and because the NGOs see it as the army’s responsibility to give mental
health support to their (ex)forces. Over the years, as interlocutors have pointed out, a more
nuanced vision on ex-PACs seems to have been adapted by some human rights defenders.
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For example, the current representative of the National Victim Movement, acknowledges
difﬁculties that survivors are facing with the PNR regarding ‘victim/ex-PAC’ and favours
focusing on the violation of human rights as departure criteria and not ‘who is victim (retur-
nee and internally displaced person)’ and ‘who is PAC’, certainly in the case of widows.98
This opinion is shared by a state representative directly responsible for the management of
the PNR; however he states that he holds a minority position in the whole discussion.99
Conclusions
This bottom-up analysis of the way Guatemala is dealing with its past of gross human rights
violations shows the importance of understanding and interconnecting the socio-political
and cultural complexities on both macro and micro levels. It reveals howmacro level initiat-
ives can cross-cut local social recovery processes when there is a mismatch between those
two levels. In fact, in the absence of a more localised approach, macro level policies will not
succeed and may even undermine those local recovery processes. Further, the above assess-
ment attempted to demonstrate that deﬁning who the victims are is a thorny question in
societies dealing with the legacy of ‘intimate’ crime, marked by a highly localised dimen-
sion and mass civil participation of atrocities that created blurred lines between victims and
perpetrators. Similarly, post-conﬂict Peru has been confronted with the difﬁcult question of
who deserves to be victim and who does not. During the design of the Integral Plan of
Reparations (PIR), a debate broke loose on the concept of ‘clear hands’ as elaborated
under international human rights law which dictates that people who ask for redress
should have clear hands.100 In the Peruvian case this refers to the exclusion of members
of illegally armed groups, such as the Shining Path, and their families who suffered state
abuse from the PIR. Yet, this debate has led to strong tensions between legal considerations
and political realities. The law codifying the PIR has adopted the Clear Hands Doctrine
through which the PIR’s implementation is faced with inquiring at the local level who
deserves reparations. Laplante, however, wonders what type of instability and new conﬂict
this will introduce in local communities who have achieved a delicate local peace and
reconciliation environment.101
Yet, this transitional-justice-from-below analysis of Guatemala also raises several
pertinent questions.
If the state and civil society had taken into account the recommendation of the CEH to
provide collective reparation measures to foster reconciliation among victims and perpetra-
tors at the local level, could this have led to a more nuanced perception of the homogeneity
of PACs? Could this have stimulated the creation of a typology of PACs in which those who
abused their power could be distinct from those who acted under coercion? What probably
would have occurred would be the real confrontation between on the one hand the ‘top-
down’ institutions and organisations and the local blurred accounts, such as presented
here, on the other. This confrontation with the harsh local reality could have nurtured an
elaboration of subcategories of PACs among the designers and ﬁnancial donors of both
state programmes. This would have been very helpful in deﬁning the beneﬁciaries of a
reparation programme and in deﬁning perpetrators that should be prosecuted for human
rights violations. Yet, this assumption implies that survivors have sufﬁcient political
agency and power to inﬂuence enough of those top-down institutions and interventions
to change their agenda and interests by taking into account the real needs and priorities.
It remains an open question whether survivors, such as the Maya Q’eqchi’, have built sufﬁ-
cient citizenship capacity to play at the forefront of those macro level policies. Currently,
both victims and ex-PACs are more likely the playthings of the different political parties
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to gain votes in the elections than having their aspirations taken seriously. Not only the ex-
PACs are an interesting ﬁsh pool for political parties, victims are too. ‘Both groups are pol-
itically manipulated.’102 Due to its weak legal status, the PNR is very sensitive to political
interest. Several victim organisations have already openly complained about the politicisa-
tion of the PNR and its departmental ofﬁces since the government of Colom took power in
2008.103
Another signiﬁcant and interrelated question is whether this typology at the macro level
would have avoided new political polarisation and the resurgent divisionism at the local
level? This is highly probable. It would have signiﬁcantly empowered the political
agency of both victims and ex-PACs and fostered a shared identity of people affected by
the conﬂict. The presented ethnographic accounts reveal that in the complex reality of tran-
sitional communities people are not passive, but actively confront the violent past and its
legacy. Reﬂecting on Guatemala’s micro reality, the conception of Mamdani as ‘survivor’,
instead of victim versus ex-PAC, is very useful as it refers to ‘all those who continue to be
blessed with life in the aftermath of civil war’, i.e. people should move beyond the dichot-
omy of victim-perpetrator as a way of searching for new forms of justice and coexistence.104
This bottom-up account shows further that the analysis and interpretation of the survi-
vors’ own perceptions and ideas are therefore a necessary precondition and fundamental
step in the design and creation of whatever kind of beneﬁts programme. In post-conﬂict
societies dealing with a legacy of intimate crime, this is an important step in fostering
local reconciliation and mutual understanding of grey zones among survivors and
helping to overcome stigmatisation of victims and perpetrators.
The following words of an elder ex-PAC demonstrate how transitional justice efforts
should be designed:
Well, [if] the government would take us [victims and ex-PAC] into account, would love us, then
there would be peace. [Indeed] that broken bowl would be reconstructed, I would say, because
we would be in a community. But now, it seems that we are still in [the situation] of that bowl
being broken, because we have not yet ﬁgured out where we are in this, yes (group interview,
May 2007).
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justice context. A clear example of this development is the ‘right to truth’ as an emerging rule
of international law. Further there is also a process of judicial institutionalisation with the
18 L. Viaene
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court
(ICC).
3. Be´atrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel, ‘Introduction: Picking up the
Pieces’, in After Mass Crime. Rebuilding States and Communities, ed. Be´atrice Pouligny,
Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007),
1–16; Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice From Below: An Agenda
for Research, Policy and Praxis’, in Transitional Justice from Below. Grassroots Activism
and the Struggle for Change, ed. Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (Oxford: Hart Publish-
ing, 2008), 15–45.
4. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conﬂict and Post-Conﬂict Societies: Report of the
Secretary-General.
5. Diane Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts Revisited: Reconciling Global Norms with Local
Agency’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 18.
6. McEvoy and McGregor, ‘Transitional Justice From Below’, 5 (emphasis in original).
7. See: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conﬂict and Post-Conﬂict Societies: Report
of the Secretary-General; Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts Revisited’; Patricia Lundy, andMark
McGovern, ‘The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional Justice’, in Transitional
Justice from Below. Grassroots Activism and the Struggle for Change, ed. Kieran McEvoy
and Lorna McGregor (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 99–120.
8. See: Lieselotte Viaene and Eva Brems, ‘Transitional Justice and Cultural Context: Learning from
the Universality Debate’, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27, no. 2 (2010): 199–224.
9. Be´atrice Pouligny, ‘Building Peace in Situations of Post-Mass Crimes’, International Peace-
keeping (2002): 201–20; Kimberly Theidon, ‘Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of
Reconciliation in Postwar Peru’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, no. 50 (2006): 433–57;
Be´atrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel, eds, After Mass Crime. Rebuild-
ing States and Communities (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).
10. Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 81.
11. Inter-Diocesanal Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory (REMHI), Guatemala: Nunca
Ma´s. Informe del Proyecto Interdiocesano de Recuperacio´n de la Memoria Histo´rica,
(Guatemala: ODHAG, 1998). REMHI was the second truth commission organised by the
Catholic Church.
12. In Guatemala the large majority of the population belongs to indigenous groups such as the
Maya, The Xinka and Garifuna. The majority are Mayan which are constituted by 22 Maya
ethnic groups of which the Quiche´, Mam, Kaqchiquel and Q’eqchi’ are the biggest groups.
13. Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
14. Theidon, ‘Justice in Transition’, 246.
15. A phrase which I borrow from Kimberly Theidon. Kimberly Theidon, ‘Editorial Note’, Inter-
national Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 296.
16. Rosalind Shaw, ‘Memory Frictions: Localizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Sierra Leone’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 1 (2007): 183–207.
17. Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel, ‘Introduction: Picking up the Pieces’, 3.
18. All interviews were in Q’eqchi’, conducted with the help of an interpreter and recorded. The
survivors’ quotes appearing in this paper are extracts from those interviews. These (translated)
vignettes attempt to represent an appropriate balance between reﬂecting the nuance of Q’eqchi’
oral tradition (the authenticity of the expression of the ideas) and English written language.
19. Comisio´n para la Esclarecimiento Histo´rico CEH), Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio. Tz’inil
Na’Tab’Al (Guatemala: UNOPS, 1999).
20. They were actually legalised by Executive Decree 222 in 1983.
21. Simone Remijnse, Memories of Violence: Civil Patrols and the Legacy of Conﬂict in Joyabaj,
Guatemala (Amsterdam: Thela Latin American Series, 2002), 143.
22. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project; and Margaret Popkin, Las Patrullas Civiles Y Su
Legado: Superar La Militarizacio´n Y Polarizacio´n del Campo Guatemalteco (Washington,
DC: Centro de Derechos Humanos de la Organizacio´n Conmemorativa ‘Robert
F. Kennedy’, 1996).
The International Journal of Human Rights 19
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
23. Judith Zur, Violent Memories. Mayan War Widows en Guatemala (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998); Remijnse, Memories of Violence; Matilde Gonzalez, Se cambio´ el tiempo.
Conﬂicto y poder en territorio K’iche’ (Guatemala: AVANCSO, 2002).
24. This paper still uses the abbreviation ‘PAC’ as this is the commonly used phrase in Guatemala.
25. Susanne Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2000).
26. For more detailed discussions see Ibid.
27. J.A. Solomon, Institutional Violence: Civil Patrols in Guatemala (Washington, DC: Robert
F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, 1994).
28. Further reading: Willem Stanley and David Holidy, ‘Broad Participation, Diffuse Responsibil-
ity: Peace Implementation in Guatemala’, in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace
Agreements, ed., Stephan John Stedman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002);
Wenche Hauge and Beate Thoresen, El destino de los ex combatientes en Guatemala: ¿Obsta-
culizadores o Agentes de Cambio? (Guatemala: Magna Terra, 2007).
29. Hauge and Thoresen, El destino de los ex combatientes en Guatemala.
30. Popkin, Las Patrullas Civiles Y Su Legado.
31. Hauge and Thoresen, El destino de los ex combatientes en Guatemala.
32. This was the result of the Global Agreement on Human Rights (Mexico, 24 March 1994),
which stated that the participation of the CVDCs should be voluntary.
33. MINUGUA, La situacio´n en Centroame´rica: Procedimientos para establecer la paz ﬁrme y
duradera, y progresos para la conﬁguracio´n de una regio´n de paz, libertad, democracia y
desarrollo (UN Documento A/49/856, 1995); MINUGUA, La situacio´n en Centroame´rica:
Procedimientos para establecer la paz ﬁrme y duradera, y progresos para la conﬁguracio´n de
una regio´n de paz, libertad, democracia y desarrollo (UN Documento A/50/878, 1996).
34. The commissioners were another cornerstone of the militarisation of the rural areas. Initially
they served as civilian intermediaries between the local population and the army, but during
the war they were responsible for intelligence, surveillance and recruitment and were often
chiefs of PAC. See CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio, vol. 2, 158–80.
35. Ricardo Saenz de Tejada, ¿Vı´ctimas o vencedores? Una aproximacio´n al movimiento de los
exPAC (Guatemala: FLACSO, 2004).
36. Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project; Zur, Violent Memories; Gonza´lez, Se cambio´ el
tiempo.
37. In 1995 there were 2643 groups of PAC counted see CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio.
38. Gonza´lez, Se cambio´ el tiempo; and Remijnse, Memories of Violence.
39. Pablo De Greiff, Contributing to Peace and Justice. Establishing Links between DDR and
Reparations (Bonn: Working Group on Development and Peace, 2007).
40. Helen Mack, ‘La reconciliacio´n en Guatemala: un proceso ausente’, in Verdad, justicia y
reparacio´n. Desafı´os para la democracia y la convivencia social, ed. Gilda Pacheco
Oreamuno and Lorena Acevedo Narea (IIDH/IDEA International, 2005), 196.
41. Remijnse, Memories of Violence.
42. Solomon, Institutional Violence: Civil Patrols in Guatemala; Popkin, Las Patrullas Civiles Y
Su Legado; and Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project.
43. REMHI, Guatemala: Nunca Ma´s.
44. Former Head of the Secretary of Strategic Analysis (2000–2002) during the Portillo govern-
ment, Minister of Foreign Affairs (2002–2004) and coordinator of the REMHI-project of the
Catholic Church (1995–1998), e-mail interview, 15 September 2009.
45. Massacre of Santiago Atitla´n (1993), Massacre of Xaman (May 2004), Case Rio Negro (May
2008).
46. Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003), 53–54.
47. Tristan Anne Borer, ‘ATaxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: Human Rights and Reconcilia-
tion in South Africa’, Human Rights Quarterly 25 (2003): 1088.
48. Ibid., 1091.
49. Trudy Govier and Willem Verwoerd, ‘How Not To Polarize “Victims” and “Perpetrators”’,
Peace Review 16, no. 3 (2004): 371.
50. A phrase I borrow from Gonza´lez, Se cambio´ el tiempo.
20 L. Viaene
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
51. This term refers mainly to people who identify themselves as non-indigenous, Spanish speak-
ing and US/Europe oriented. Although 60% of the population is indigenous, the ladino culture
is the dominant one.
52. Hereafter called: PAC programme.
53. Sa´enz de Tejada, ¿Vı´ctimas o vencedores?; and Hauge and Thoresen, El destino de los ex com-
batientes en Guatemala.
54. The FRG is the party of ex-general Efraı´n Rı´os Montt. Under his regime (1982–1983) most
killings, massacres and disappearances took place and he is seen as the architect of the
genocide.
55. Sa´enz de Tejada, ¿Vı´ctimas o vencedores.
56. Edgar Gutierrez, email interview, 15 September 2009.
57. Amnesty International (AI), Guatemala. The Civil Defence Patrols Re-Emerge (London:
Amnesty International, 2002); Remijnse, Memories of Violence.
58. For a more detailed discussion of the compensation debate, see USAID/CIEN, Informe sobre
el aporte de capital a exPAC (Guatemala: USAID/CIEN, 2003).
59. AI, Guatemala. The Civil Defence Patrols Re-Emerge.
60. Sonia Pere, Prensa Libre, 13 July 2002.
61. Acuerdo Gubernativo 406–2005.
62. Interview with deputy Efrain Oliva Morales, sub-secretary of the Executing Coordination
Secretary of the Presidency and responsible for the negotiation commission with PAC
during the Berger government, 6 May 2009.
63. MINUGUA, Informe de Veriﬁcacio´n. El estado de cumplimiento de las recomendaciones de la
Comisio´n para el Esclarecimiento Histo´rico (Guatemala: MINUGUA, 2004); Gustavo Porras
Castejon, ‘El Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento: Co´mo Se Quiso, Co´mo Es y Co´mo Debe
Ser’, In Primer Informe Tema´tico 2006–2007 del Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, La
vida no tiene precio. Acciones y Omisiones de Resarcimiento en Guatemala (Guatemala:
Magna Terra, 2007), 27–36.
64. General Agreement on Human Rights, VIII, Mexico D.F., 29 March 1994.
65. Recommendations III – 12&13.
66. Recommendations, III – 11.
67. Acuerdo Gubernativo 258–2003.
68. Acuerdo Gubernativo 619–2005.
69. Manual de Cualiﬁcacio´n de Beneﬁciarios del Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, PNR,
2004.
70. Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, Informe de la evaluacio´n conjunta del Programa Nacio-
nal de Resarcimiento y de los Programas de Apoyo al PNR de GTZ y PNUD (Guatemala: PNR,
2007); Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, Informe de Labores 2008 (Guatemala: PNR,
2008); Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, Informe de Labores 2009 (Guatemala: PNR,
2009).
71. Ibid.
72. CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio.
73. Alfonso Huet, Nos Salvo´ la Sagrada Selva. La Memoria de Veinte Comunidades Q’eqchi’es
que sobrevivieron al Genocidio (Guatemala: Magna Terra, 2008).
74. Carlos Flores, Bajo La Cruz, Coba´n (Guatemala: Centro Ak’kutan, 2001).
75. CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio.
76. Ibid., vol. 2, 230 and 234.
77. Personal communication with ex-collaborator of the CEH-ofﬁce in Peten, April 2008, Guate-
mala ciudad.
78. AVANCSO, ¿Do´nde esta´ el futuro? Procesos de reintegracio´n en comunidades de retorno
(Guatemala: AVANCSO, 1992).
79. For more see: Centro de Estudios Integrados de Desarrollo Comunal, Guatemala. Polos de
Desarrollo. El caso de la Desestructuracio´n de las Comunidades Indı´genas (Me´xico: Editorial
Praxis, 1998).
80. AVANSCO, ¿Do´nde esta´ el futuro?; and Huet, Nos Salvo´ la Sagrada Selva.
81. Human Rights Watch/Americas, Guatemala. Return to Violence. Refugees, Civil Patrollers,
and Impunity 8, no. 1 (B) (1996).
82. Between 2000 and 2006 there were 464 land conﬂicts with a concentration in municipalities of
Coba´n and San Pedro Carcha. Secretarı´a de Asuntos Agrarios Presidencia de la Repu´blica
The International Journal of Human Rights 21
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
Guatemala, Las ocupaciones de tierra en Guatemala: caracterizacio´n y lı´neas de atencio´n.
Informe Final (Guatemala: 2007).
83. Huet, Nos Salvo´ la Sagrada Selva.
84. CEH, Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio.
85. A phrase I borrow from Pouligny, Chesterman and Schnabel, ‘Introduction: Picking up the
Pieces’.
86. Roberta Culbertson and Be´atrice Pouligny, ‘Re-imagining Peace after Mass Crime: A Dialo-
gical Exchange between Insider and Outsider Knowledge’, in After Mass Crime. Rebuilding
States and Communities, ed. Be´atrice Pouligny, Simon Chesterman and Albrecht Schnabel
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), 271–88.
87. Tzuultaq’a (‘Hill-Valley’) or mountain spirits is a central concept determining the identity and
being of the Q’eqchi’. It is omnipresent, guiding and overseeing of all actions of daily life. The
idea of a personal, transcendent God is not inherent to their cosmovision; however they do not
ignore the Christian God, as the majority of Q’eqchi’ are Catholic. Esteban Haeserijn, ‘Filosoı´a
popular de lo K’ekchi’ de hoy’, Guatemala Indı´gena 10 (1975): 44–54; Agustı´n Estrada
Monroy, Vida esote´rica Maya-Kekchı´ (Guatemala City: Ministerio de Cultura y Deportes,
1990); Richard Wilson, Maya Resurgence in Guatemala. Q’eqchi’ Experiences (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).
88. Flores, Bajo La Cruz, 43.
89. As a reaction, the guerrillas attacked the village on 10 May 1982 ending in the massacre of 22
people, including two children.
90. Personal interview, May 2008.
91. The function of the ex-PAC is unpaid, whereas the mayor receives a salary from the Coba´n
municipality.
92. For an in-depth analysis on local Maya Q’eqchi’ practices and attitudes on justice and recon-
ciliation: Lieselotte Viaene, ‘The Internal Logic of the Cosmos as ‘Justice’ and ‘Reconcilia-
tion’. Micro-perceptions from Post-Conﬂict Guatemala’, Critique of Anthropology 30, No. 3
(2010): 287–312.
93. Personal interview with dirigente ex-Pac in Salacium, May 2008.
94. For a fuller discussion of Mayan Q’eqchi’ perceptions on the PNR see Lieselotte Viaene, ‘Life
is Priceless: Maya Q’eqhi’ Voices on the Guatemalan National Reparations Program, Inter-
national Journal of Transitional Justice 4, no. 1 (2010), 4–25.
95. PNUD, Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano. Diversidad etnico-cultural: la ciudadanı´a
en un estado plural (Guatemala: PNUD, 2005), 332.
96. Interview, Coordinator Regional Ofﬁce PNR, Coba´n, 15 February 2010.
97. Interview, Roqha’ Pasacuc, February 2010.
98. Interview, President National Victims Movement Q’anil Tinamit, 6 May 2009.
99. Interview, Public Functionary of the PNR, 18 March 2009.
100. For a fuller discussion: Lisa Laplante, ‘The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine:
Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition’, American University Inter-
national Law Review 23 (2007): 51–90.
101. Ibid., at 81.
102. Interview with deputy Efrain Oliva Morales, sub-secretary of the Executing Coordination
Secretary of the Presidency and responsible for the negotiation commission with PAC
during the Berger government, 6 May 2009.
103. See the public statements of several human rights organisations and victim organisations, on
the National Day of the Digniﬁcation of the Victims of the Conﬂict, 25 February 2009.
104. Mahmood Mamdani,When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide
in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 273.
Notes on contributor
Lieselotte Viaene is a PhD researcher at the Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Belgium. She
has a background in criminology (BA, MA), with a master’s degree in comparative cultural studies.
Her research focuses on the intersection between human rights, legal anthropology and traditional
justice with a case study of Guatemala.
22 L. Viaene
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vi
ae
ne
, 
Li
es
el
ot
te
] 
At
: 
10
:4
1 
6 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
10
